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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes a site and services project, developed
by a local housing agency, IVZ (Zacatecas Housing Agency) and
financed by a national agency, FONHAPO (National Fund for Low-
Income Housing). This program was implemented in Zacatecas City
in Mexico, between September 1983 and August 1985, in a site
known as 'La Pimienta'. The analysis focuses on the cost-
recovery process and the way it was implemented. This paper
analyzes the reasons for the high rate of default in loan
repayments experienced during the cost recovery stages of this
project, one year after its completion. This analysis also
focuses, on the way in which community participation contributed
to the low rate of cost recovery. As a guideline, five topics
were used to evaluate the requirements suggested to achieve an
acceptable rate of repayment: (i) the affordability of the
project; (ii) the participants understanding of the nature of
their financial obligation; (iii) the efficiency of collection
systems; (iv) the efficacy of the incentives and sanctio ns; and
(v) the consistency of political support for cost recovery. This
thesis concludes that although these requirements were followed
to some extent, the key element in the low recovery was the
organized opposition of the community explaining the way it
evolved.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis analyzes a site and services project, developed
by a local housing agency, IVZ (Zacatecas Housing Agency) and
financed by a national agency, FONHAPO (National Fund for Low-
Income Housing). The program was implemented in Zacatecas City
in Mexico, between September 1983 and August 1985. The analysis
focuses on the cost-recovery process and the way it was
implemented.
The high rate of default in loan repayments experienced
during the cost recovery stages of this project, one year after
its completion, intrigued and induced me to study the reasons for
such a phenomenon. Also, the way in which community
participation contributed to the low rate of cost recovery, make
this particular project worthy to analyze. Usually, community
participation is considered a positive element in bolstering
housing programs; it is my intent to analyze and explain the
conditions that led to a negative result in the case of this
project.
A program of this magnitude was not implemented by any
housing agency in Zacatecas, until the new policies of
decentralization of housing programs in Mexico were in effect in
4
CHAPTER I
1982.1 Therefore, this is an interesting case to analyze in
terms of efficiency and replicability possibilities within a
perspective of future programs in Mexico. The relevance of cost
recovery for a local housing agency grows, as the scarcity of
fiscal resources for housing finance deteriorate day by day,
under the harsh impact of economic crisis in developing
countries.
As a guideline, this paper evaluates the five requirements
suggested to achieve an acceptable rate of repayment: (i) the
affordability of the project; (ii) the participants understanding
of the nature of their financial obligation; (iii) the efficiency
of collection systems; (iv) the efficacy of the incentives and
sanctions; and (v) the consistency of political support for cost
recovery (Sanyal, 1987).
Information for this paper was gathered from files at IVZ -
the local agency, in Zacatecas City and FONHAPO's -the national
agency, regional offices in Durango City during the summer of
1987. Interviews with FONHAPO and IVZ personnel, municipal
authorities, and users were conducted during the same period.
1 The housing units constructed from 1984 to 1986 by IVZ in
Zacatecas City (1,800) doubled the amount of units constructed by
the other two national agencies operating in this city from 1980
to 1986.
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This study is divided into four chapters. The first one
introduces the scope of the research and its objectives. The
second chapter describes the project components: the arrangements
and responsibilities among the participant institutions; the
different phases the project was divided; how affordability was
calculated; and the scheme for repayments 
-the amount of monthly
payments, the collection system, the sanctions and incentives.
The third chapter assesses the main problems faced during cost
recovery. It describes the magnitude of the problem, the changes
in the composition of the different phases, the adverse changes
in the national economy and its effect at the micro level; the
uneven relationship between IVZ and FONHAPO responsibilities and
the unique nature of community involvement in the problem. The
fourth and final chapter provides some recommendations for
improvement in project development and management that would
facilitate a satisfactory performance in cost recovery.
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II. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT
This project was implemented in 1983 by IVZ, a decentralized
body of the government of the State of Zacatecas in Mexico. It
was first intended to cover the housing needs of those low-
income people, working in the informal sector, unattended by the
housing agencies operating at the national level. It was also an
attempt by the state government to slow down the number of
illegal settlements in the capital city, through the provision of
serviced plots -water supply, electricity, sewerage, and paved
roads, and trough the provision of land tenure.
Zacatecas is the capital city of the northern state of
Zacatecas. Formerly an important mining city, Zacatecas
experienced a prolonged stagnation after the Mexican revolution
in 1910, due to the decline of the mining activity and the
decline of the rural structure of the 'Hacienda System'.
Beginning in 1960, Zacatecas experienced a reactivation in its
economy as a consequence of its increasing importance as an
administrative center with growing commercial activity
-basically as a center for distribution of agricultural products,
and as an educational center.
Zacatecas City population grew from 72,124 people in 1960,
to 144,079 in 1970, to 160,778 in 1980 and to 186,326 in 1984
(INEGI,1986). This considerable increase in its population
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raised the demand for public services and for housing. The
insufficient supply of housing and the high cost of housing units
provided by the commercial financial system pushed the state
government to look for affordable housing alternatives.2
In 1982 the government of Zacatecas received from the
federal government about 200 hectares of urban land in different
parts of the state formerly owned by INDECO (Institute for
Community Development). These land reserves and monetary
resources allocated by the state government constituted the seed
capital to initiate the operations of a local housing agency.
The administrative structure of the agency consisted of an
executive council, and a technical council. The first one was
presided by the State Governor as an honorary Chairman, a
Technical Director, and different members of the state cabinet -
Finances, Public Works, Planning as counselors. This group was
responsible to determine and authorize the programs proposed by
the technical body, and authorize the annual budget and to
evaluate the programs developed by the agency. The technical
council headed the Technical Director consisted of a Department
of Construction, a Department of Administration and a Department
Social Work and Promotion of Programs. Among its tasks were to
2 The first illegal settlements appeared in Zacatecas City
in the mid 70's, and were a continues discomfort for the state
and municipal governments, since their dwellers grouped often in
opposition political parties, being active demanders for public
services.
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promote, implement and administrate housing programs.
In 1983 IVZ worked out with a national housing agency
-FONHAPO, a loan for the construction of a sites and services
project in Zacatecas City. This national agency operates with
fiscal resources provided by the federal government as well as
with funds recovered from its credit repayments. FONHAPO, in
addition to being a direct financing agency for housing
development, also provides loans to public agencies operating at
a local level. Projects financed by FONHAPO are intended mainly
for those working in the informal sector.
2.1 INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
The financial schemes were formulated by the main financial
source -FONHAPO, and by IVZ, the financial intermediary and the
credit warrantor. IVZ provided the land, carried out the
selection of beneficiaries, the selection of building
contractors, the allotment of housing units and credit recovery
to be repaid to FONHAPO. FONHAPO on the other hand, provided the
necessary financial resources for the different phases of the
project and established the guidelines for cost recovery and
credit regulations.
In addition to financial capital provided by the housing
agencies, the state and the municipal governments contributed to
9
the program with complementary services. For example a primary
school was built at the site; a market was built next to it and a
bus route extended to the site. The city waterworks agency
contributed in increasing the water supply to the site.
Under FONHAPO regulations, community participation was to be
fostered through a 'support committee'. It consisted of users
who were elected as representatives by the prospective dwellers
from each program financed by FONHAPO. The task of the support
committee was to provide a communication link between users and
the agency. Its rcle was to help the applicant in the selection
process and in monitoring the project. Once the plot allotment
was completed, the committee was to promote community development
and help the agency in identifying problems related to the
evolution of the project.'
2.2 'LA PIMIENTA'
From the IVZ land reserve, a 30 Ha. site known as 'La
Pimienta', was chosen for the sites and services project. The
site, located at the north of the city, was accessible by public
transport. Infrastructure services -water, sewerage and
electricity were available from the adjacent residential areas.
3 FONHAPO strongly encouraged community participation as a
mean to strengthen the social component for housing programs.
Under contract regulations a support committee is to be elected
once the demand is consclidated, as requisite to proceed for any
credit application (FONHAPO, 1984)
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Its location, in an area populated basically by low income
families, was suitable for a project of sites and services.
The project initiated in 1983, originally had a specific
financial policy regarding disbursement and recovery
arrangements. It was also to be based on a physical development
process of sites and services. The average plot size was 120
square meter with water supply, sewerage and electricity. Other
urban services were street lighting and asphalt-paved roads. A
total of 1,236 serviced plots were to be built in 'La Pimienta'.
However before the construction stage for this project was
completed, a new component for 300 core houses was added.
However, the original scheme was changed. While classifying
the demand for the sites and services program, IVZ identified
families interested in having access to a program with a higher
level of services. Considering that a program offering finished
housing units would attract a broader social component, and could
have a greater social and political impact,*
IVZ solicited and obtained from FONHAPO a new credit for 300
core-house units. As the sites and services project neared
completion, both agencies decided to take advantage of the fact
that services provisions were nearly complete and hence decided
to incorporate the new 300 units within the project area That
* The agency by this time had only two years of operation
and was willing for an opportunity to be known in the local scene.
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consisted of a loan for 300 core houses, to be built in plots
which should have been allocated according to the first program.
As a consequence, the initial plots for the sites and services
project, was reduced by 300 plots.
In September 1984, and under very special circumstances, a
new component was agreed by IVZ and FONHAPO. By this time
FONHAPO had organized a competition for low-income housing design
alternatives. As part of the competition, two of the winning
designs were to be constructed at two different cities. FONHAPO
was to provide the required financial resources but the land was
to be supplied by two local agencies. When one of the local
agencies failed to provide the necessary land, FONHAPO was forced
to look for a suitable site to build one of the winning designs.
'La Pimienta' seemed like an appropriate site because the sites
and services construction phase was nearly completed.5 In
September 1984 IVZ and FONHAPO signed a new credit agreement for
800 additional core houses, to be constructed on plots from the
first program. Thus, the original scheme for sites and services
reduced again -this time by 800 plots. As we will see later,
these changes in the project during its implementation, posed
crucial problems in cost recovery.
5 Both agencies considered that a positive political impact
for this program was granted, since the advanced development of
the serviced plots project, would decrease considerably the
construction phase for the housing program.
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To sum up them, once the program was completed, the first
phase ended with 136 serviced plots, 80% of which were financed
by FONHAPO. IVZ provided the rest as well as the land for the
project. The second phase included 300 core-houses units
financed by 80% FONBAPO capital and 20% of IVZ resources
respectively. The third phase of 800 core units was constructed
with 90% FONHAPO contribution and 10% of IVZ resources.
Table 1
The composition of 'La Pimienta' project
Contract Type of No. of
Date Unit Units
Cost of
Proj ect
Component
(1)
11/24/83 Sites and Services 136 19,955
06/21/84 Core-Houses 300 174,474
08/20/84 Core-Houses 800 863,967
(1) In thousand Mexican Pesos
Source: IVZ annual report, September 1985
2.3 AFFORDABILITY
In ensuing full cost recovery, each applicant was asked to
submit (i) proof of income, (ii) proof of one or more years of
residence in the area and, (iii) testimony that they did not own
a home. Preference was given, particularly for the first two
phases of the program, to families with three or more members and
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to the self-employed. These criterion were established by the
agencies in order to create access of families with a proven
record of residence in the area, and who were normally excluded
from other housing programs.' Affordability level was calculated
for every phase, and varied accordingly and the particulars are
as follows:
A. 'La Pimienta ', PHASE I
This project consisted of serviced plots, of an average size
of 120 square meter, with water supply, sewerage and electricity
at each plot. Other urban services were street lighting and
asphalt-paved roads. The cost of the plot was 158,350 Mexican
pesos. The income required to apply for a house was from 0.5 to
1.5 times the minimal wage.' The financing to the household was
based on 10% interest rate per year, increased by 10% every year.
The down payment was 10,800 pesos and was payable within a period
of six months before the lots were occupied." The loan term was
ten years.
* FOVISSSTE and INFONAVIT are the other two national
agencies operating in Zacatecas. The former promotes programs
for state employees and the latter, for people working in the
formal sector.
' The credit cost was calculated by the agencies to take no
more than 20% of the users monthly income, in order to maintain
the program in an affordable level.
* As 12.5% of the minimal wage accumulated in six months.
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B. 'LA PIMIENTA', PHASE II
The core-house units of Phase II were built at a cost of
$ 584,900 Mexican pesos per unit. Size of the units ranged from
32 to 38 square meter. The revised financial arrangement was
based on a 10 year loan term and 11% interest rate with 10% of
yearly increase rate. Income requirements for this phase ranged
from 1.6 to 2.0 times the minimal wage. Affordability rate was
calculated on the basis of 25% of monthly income for housing.
10% of the unit price was required as a down payment.9
C. LA PIMIENTA, PHASE III
The sale price was 1'079,960.00 pesos per core-house unit.
The loan term for the credit was 20 years with a 10% down
payment1". Households with incomes from 2.1 to 2.5 times the
minimal wage were eligible for a core-house unit. This project
presented a significant difference in terms of interest rates and
cost recovery criteria when FONHAPO changed its policies for cost
recovery. Interest rates for monthly payments were increased up
to 15% per year, based on an annual increase according to the
economic indices set by the Bank of Mexico. These increases were
set to compensate for the declining conditions in the national
* As 30% of the accumulated salary for six months.
10 As 15 % of monthly salary.
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economy.11
The basis for monthly payments under these new dispositions,
also had to be in accordance with the increases for minimal wage
determined by the federal government. Under the new policy, up
to 45% of the monthly salary was to be dispensed for repayment
for the 800 units program. These changing conditions forced IVZ
to change its eligibility criteria and decided to allow
participants with income above what was originally decided upon
12. On the other hand, some participants had withheld of their
income particulars, in order to maintain the eligibility status.
" The growing inflation rate was a key element behind these
changes. Inflation rate jumped from 42% in 1984, to 73.7% in 1985
and to 105.7% in 1986% (Banco de Mexico).
12 From IVZ's files, it was possible to find more then 120
families for the third program, with monthly incomes well above
the maximum established for this program -2.5 times the minimal
wage.
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Table 3.
Affordability Levels for 'La Pimienta' Housing Projects
Program Income Annual % Salary Required
for Interest for
Eligibility Rate on Monthly Payments
(1) Loan (2)
Pimienta I 0.5-1.5 10% 20
Pimienta II 1.6-2.0 11% 25
Pimienta III 2.1-2.5 15% 55
(1) Times the minimal wage
(2) For Pimienta I & II, there was an additional 10% increase
annually; for Pimienta III, the interest rate was indexed.
Source: Instituto Zacatecano de Vivienda
2.4 COLLECTION OF PAYMENTS
Collection of repayments was carried out directly by
through a system similar to the collection of fees for
electricity and water. Through a computerized accounting
invoices were issued to the users every month, indicating
previous balance and amount to be paid. Payments were to
at IVZ offices located in the center of the city or at a
commercial bank.
IVZ
system,
be made
Information on repayment were propagated in different ways.
For the first phase of the project prospective beneficiaries were
contacted for meetings organized by the municipal authorities and
IVZ. In those meetings, most of which were held at the City
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Hall, the credit conditions were explained by IVZ personnel. That
included discussions on: income requirements, loan terms,
interest rates, monthly payments, cost per unit, etc.13  For the
300 core-house units in the second phase, information was
advertised in the local newspapers and radio stations. For the
remaining 800 core-house units, three informational meetings were
organized by IVZ under FONHAPO supervision. More than 400
families attended each of the sessions. Under such circumstances
it was difficult for the project beneficiaries to establish a
one to one dialogue with the agency personnel.
2.5 SANCTIONS AND INCENTIVES
There was no special incentive designed for early payments
or payments in advance. Sanctions for arrears were to be
according to the legal dispositions of the State of Zacatecas
established when the Zacatecas Housing Agency was founded (IVZ,
1983). According to that law, households with arrears of three
or more months were to be evicted, and subject to legal
procedures under the State Law.
13 A total of 2136 families were recorded as the audience
for those meetings.(IVZ, Meeting Minutes)
18
COST RECOVERY: WHAT WENT WRONG?
Cost recovery began a month after plot allocation for
every phase. As the project was developed in three different
phases, plots and housing units were allocated at different
times. The serviced plots were the first to be allocated. From
February to March 1985 all the 136 plots were assigned and
allocated. By september of 1985, from information at the IVZ
records, 131 (97%) of the serviced plots showed building in
progress. Two months later 32 of this plots (24%) had families
living there.
Housing units for the second phase were assigned between
February and April of the same year and a period of one month was
given to families to occupy houses. By September of 1985, 5% of
the housing units for this phase were still unoccupied. The
allocation of housing units included in the third phase took
place between April and July of 1985. In September of the same
year 89% of such houses was occupied and the repayment by
beneficiaries went according to schedule.
Arrears in repayments first became known in March 1986.
About 35 accounts (4.3%) from the third program showed three
months in arrears by that time, increasing to 4.4% by April and
9.0% by May. At this point, a group of 63 families (7.8%) from
19
CHAPTER II I .
the third program appealed to the court for a freeze on
increases in monthly payments and started depositing rents in an
escrow account. By August, this group grew to 322 families
(26.8% of the total of beneficiaries for the program), and
included participants from the first and second phases, who also
made a parallel request for a freeze on monthly payments to IVZ
authorities.
Table 3. REPAYMENT ARREARS IN 1986
# of Households in Arrears (%)
Units MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG
LA PIMIENTA I 136 1.4 2.1 2.9 5.4 8.8 9.5
LA PIMIENTA II 300 2.6 5.6 9.6 16.0 33.3 38.6
LA PIMIENTA III 800 4.3 4.8 9.0 16.3 22.8 29.3
Source: Instituto Zacatecano de Vivienda. (Annual Report, 1986)
This process initiated a serious decline in cost recovery
which, so far, had been relatively satisfactory. By August 1986,
accounts with three or more months in arrears reached a peak of
32.6% for the second phase and 27.1% for the third phase. This
sharp increase in arrears in a short period of time seriously
undermined the IVZ and caused major problems in the repayment of
its loan to FONHAPO.
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What were the causes behind this sharp decline in cost
recovery? Was it caused by the changes in the composition of the
program, involving different house units and different credit
conditions? or, was it a decline in the affordability of the
users due to adverse and unexpected conditions 
-high inflation
rate, lower wages increases?. Was it a consequence of the
failure of the collections systems or a result of the
inexperience of the newly created housing agency? or, was it an
outcome of conflicting interests among public agencies and vested
government interests? These concerns are to be addressed in the
rest of the chapter.
Lcoking at the way in which cost recovery arrears
developed, it is noteworthy that a higher number of households
with arrears in repayment were the users for the 300 and 800
core-house units. More importantly, it was not a 'typical'
default crisis where users ceased to pay at all. The situation
in this project evolved in a quite different way. A number of
users refused to pay for the increase in the monthly payment
which was stipulated under contractual conditions, but continued
to pay to an escrow account.
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Table 4. HOUSEHOLDS MAKING MONTHLY PAYMENTS IN AN ESCROW ACCOUNT
# of (cumulative) Number of Households (%)
Units MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG
LA PIMIENTA I 136 0 0 0 1.4 2.9 5.1
LA PIMIENTA II 300 1.3 3.6 7.3 13.3 28.0 32.6
LA PIMIENTA III 800 2.5 3.2 7.8 14.2 20.1 27.1
Source: Instituto Zacatecano de Vivienda
Once again, the highest number of defaulting households
belonged to the second and third phases of the project. Could it
be possible that the increase in monthly payments were higher for
these groups, making the credit unaffordable to them?. This is
an unlikely situation since the second phase of the project was
based on softer credit characteristics and, in the selection
process for the third phase, a good number of applicants with
incomes well above the limits established for affordability were
accepted. Conversely, households in the sites and services
program who were relatively poor had a higher repayment rate.
Hence, the decline in income, though important may not have been
a decisive element for this unsatisfactory rate of cost recovery.
Could it be that the collection system collapsed or suddenly
deteriorated?. Looking again at the numbers, for more than half
a year the cost-recovery operated quite efficiently. Problems
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emerged first after the first increase in monthly payments of the
second and third phases. Once the first instances of arrears
were spotted, IVZ sent warning notices to the delinquent
households. In several cases debtors were contacted personally
by IVZ workers to give them advise and to negotiate repayment
plans. No eviction was made however. Although by June 1986
three families from the second phase and fifteen from the third
one moved out in their own, requesting for credit cancellations.
Nine of them were moving out of town and three other families
attributed their decision to financial difficulties and asked for
the authorized refund.
3.1 COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION: THE KEY TO LOW REPAYMENT
The way in which the households requested for a legal
solution to monthly payments freeze, and the increasing number of
families that joined this alternative, seems to be a critical
factor in explaining repayment problem. This can be explained,
to a larger extent, by the way in which community participation
evolved in the 'La Pimienta' project area.
The first elected community committees acted in a regular
basis until the house allotment for the third phase was carried
out. They were a key element in lobbying for the construction of
a primary school at the site, in supporting the agency in
organizing information meetings, and in advising families in the
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allocation process. These committees continued to function till
to the appearance of a 'splinter' group which emerged in response
to shortages in water supply and to oppose the first increases
for monthly payments and interest rates.
Housing units and plots were affected by water supply
shortages and deficiencies in street lighting during the first
six months of operation of the project. These events affected
units in all three phases of the project. Water supply problems
were caused mainly by delays in increasing the supply from the
municipal network. The provision of water was irregular and when
the shortages were critical, for instance two weeks without
water, the waterworks agency provided the service through water
tanks. This situation lasted until the site was finally
integrated to the new municipal water supply network.
The municipal authorities responsible for the operation of
the lighting system, refused to accept the street lighting system
arguing inconsistencies in relation to standards set for the rest
of the city. As a consequence, serious deficiencies in operation
and maintenance occurred. Furthermore, disagreeing with the
standards in the level of other services provided in the project
-paved roads and side walks, the municipal authorities refused
to take over the site for its overall maintenance. This resulted
in the lack of municipal services such as street cleaning and
maintenance.
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The community organization turned in a different direction
after these incidents. The once cooperative support committees
started moving away from the IVZ authorities, unable to satisfy
the users' demand for the regular provision of public services.
These events acted as a catapult for the formation of a 'splinter
group' which took the lead in organizing the residents. At this
point, the original committees broke up nd the splinter group
assumed a 'de facto' leadership.
Crucial to the evolution of the 'new' committee was the
prior experience of some of its leaders as activist. Three of
them were professionals working at the local university, and were
active members of opposition parties. The local university, with
its strong opposition to the ruling party and its institutions,
was active supporter of peasants and squatters movements"*. The
organizational skills of this group was quite effective in the
way they used the media and the way they mobilized the users when
shortages in water supply and irregularities in public services
surfaced"
14 For a detailed illustration of the active role of Mexican
university leaders in urban conflicts, see "The Social Basis of
Urban Populism: Squatters and the State in Latin America" in M.
Castells, 1983.
i Regularly, the local newspapers reported the
irregularities in the new project. Users were organized to
demonstrate on downtown streets also.
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The group managed to operate directly, lobbying municipal
authorities in its demand for better services. This activity
increased the distrust of the city authorities towards the
housing project, who feared that once the municipality assumed
the control and responsibility for maintenance of the public
services of the project it will become a political issue to be
used against the municipal authorities.
The political awareness of the splinter group can be
identified by their clear understanding of the major changes in
the government machinery. By September 1986 in Zacatecas, a new
state administration had to be inaugurated. As part of the
changes in the state machinery, IVZ also had to change its
administrative staff. The executive council compound by members
of the state government cabinet and its chairman the Governor had
to step down. The technical council appointed by the governor
had to step down too. At this juncture the 'splinter' group
started negotiations with the authorities with the hope of
receiving better financial terms once the administration was to
leave.
The first outcome of these negotiations was the freezing of
monthly repayments, until the credit scheme was reviewed by
FONHAPO. IVZ was unable to decide the monthly payments since the
credit conditions were determined by FONHAPO. While recognizing
the need to review the variations in financial terms between the
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different phases, no changes were accepted by FONHAPO for the
original credit conditions, because they were convinced that the
household incomes were still above the affordability levels. The
users, however, refused to accept this and continued to pay their
old amount to the escrow account.
The users committee showed then a clear understanding
of the legal system. Instead of withholding payments, they opted
for the legal procedure of depositing in the escrow account,
until a final decision was made by the court. They knew that timle
would eventually work in their favor because of the slow nature
of the legal system. In doing so they avoided the possibilities
of eviction since payments, though low, were continued to be
deposited. In addition, while waiting for the court decision,
the new administration when it assumed responsibility, found the
project beneficiaries in a strong position to renegotiate the
monthly increases.
This situation continued until February 1988 when FONHAPO
and IVZ reached a compromise in negotiating the credit
conditions. IVZ with the financial support from the state
government assumed full responsibility for defaults in credit
repayments to FONHAPO. As a result, IVZ set lower monthly
payments conditions, subsidizing the payments to FONHAPO with its
own resources. FONHAPO, in turn, authorized the re-sale of
vacant units, setting housing unit prices according to actual
27
market prices.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMIENDATIONS
Looking at the evolution of the 'La Pimienta" housing
project it is not possible to isolate one single aspect of the
program as the cause for the poor cost recovery. But it is a
combination of several aspects that took place over the period of
implementation. The key aspects can however summarized as
follows:
4.1 AFFORDABILITY
Although the project was affordable for most of the
participants, it created some problems. High income requirements
for the last two phases meant elimination of the original target
group. This process of "gentrification" has been identified as
common in the housing programs for low income groups (Swan et.al.
1983). When there is a subsidy, as in the case of 'La Pimienta'
-through credits well below the commercial interest rates, market
and political mechanisms may easily cause the expulsion of
poor.(Rodell, 1983) Moreover,the sharp increases in the interest
rate created some problems for even the relatively upper income
project beneficiaries.
4.2 ARBITRARY VARIATION IN THE SCOPE OF THE PROJECT
A restraint in the attitude of the public agencies to
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achieve visible and impressive results could have avoided the
shift from sites and services projects towards projects with
higher standards. Such restraints could have well avoided the
harmful changes in the composition of the project and, more
importantly, the managerial difficulties arising from them,
especially monitoring different credit conditions within a
project. Even though variations are often necessary, they have
to be in consultation with the community. Such consultation did
not take place in La Pimienta.
4.3 EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION
As part of the project there was no clear process of
communication and dissemination of information. Such
deficiencies often lead to unilateral decisions without the
knowledge of the project beneficiaries. A year after they had
occupied the housing units in La Pimienta, diffusion of
information and the channels of communication between the users
and the agency deteriorated. But by then, the users had a clear
understanding of the nature of the program and its implications.
As I have shown earlier, such an understanding, however, was used
against the agency.
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4.4 ENFORCEMENT OF SANCTIONS AND INCENTIVES
This is the issue of whether effective measures, in the form
of incentives and sanctions were used to promote cost recovery.
Mechanism of incentives and sanctions are complex tools which
requires an efficient administration and adequate political will
which involve a continued commitment. Unfortunately in
Zacatecas, changes in state administration and the conflicts of
interest between the municipal administration and the housing
agency, became key factors that adversely affected the normal
provision of public services and the enforcement of sanctions and
evictions. For example, the municipality clearly showed its
unwillingness to be involved in resolving any conflict in 'La
Pimienta' at the risk of losing its popularity.
IVZ on the other hand, did not have sufficient political
backing for strict collection of payments and also to enforce
sanctions. When the first few defaulters were not evicted, it
set a bad precedent for other defaulters to follow; and, once the
repayment arrears rocketed, it was impossible for the agency to
take any legal measure for eviction against such a large number
of families.
As a means to encourage early repayments, more emphasis
should have been placed on incentives for timely repayments. The
project from the beginning had no mechanism to encourage early or
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on-time payments. Since the economic conditions for dwellers
vary, chances are that dwellers in relatively better economic
conditions would be willing to pay in advance or pay-off their
credits earlier. That create a good opportunity for the agency
to recover funds in advance and special consideration should be
given to this issue in future project design.
In the case of La Pimienta the local agency being
practically an extension of the state government, and subject to
the credit conditions of FONHAPO, had little room to negotiate
the demands with the users. More autonomy for the local agency,
in negotiating terms of repayment, could increase the
effectiveness of the agency to devise a better credit management
system and to improve the mechanisms for cost recovery. In
addition, it is a good way to encourage institution building
which is so important in the strengthening of any public agency.
4.5 BASIS FOR COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION
The most influential factor in cost recovery for this case
was the way in which community participation evolved. This
element in housing programs has been continuously addressed and
encouraged as a means to improve the management and the outcome
of the program. From the point of view of the housing agencies
there is a strong resistance against the sharing of control and
also as a result of the political system needs (Gilbert and Ward,
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1985). In contrast there had been successful programs with
strong community participation, such is the case of the El
Salvador Sites and Services project (Bamberger, 1982). This
program in order to succeed required a lot of managerial
involvement to monitor the evolution of the project.
In 'La Pimienta' the agency approach for community
participation was one with a rigid and vertical scheme.
Decisions were made from the top to the bottom, which impeded an
active participation of the users and often blocked the feedback
from the beneficiaries.
The more flexible and direct organization of the community
group and its rewards, attracted people to actively
participate in key issues: firstly, demanding the regular supply
of public services, and secondly, once they recognized the
strength of unity, against the agency demanding the freezing of
the increase in monthly repayments. This demands, severely
affected the agency's economic situation and hampered the
progress of the program.
Major lessons can be now drawn on the need for an effective
participatory basis for the community and to maintain a steady
course of project implementation without arbitrary changes.
Besides, a strong commitment, backed by political will, to
enforce sanctions and incentives, recognizing the capacities and
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deficiencies of the participants is equally important. The
experiences from La pimienta, point to the integration of these
vital elements of the beneficiaries and its replicability.
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